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Israel Air Force Transforms to Engage in War Against Terrorism
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) went through major changes in recent years, transforming operational tactics and elevating the level of cooperation between the combat forces and the Israel Securities Authority (ISA). This evolution was necessary to improve the continued war against Palestinian terror. Some of the Israel Air Force’s (IAF) insights will be provided today by Brig. General Ido Nehushtan, Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander, IAF at the Paris Air Show.
“Our combat against Palestinian terror is a conflict between two learning networks. We had to adapt and adjust our systems while the enemy modified their tactics as they learned from our activities and patterns of operation,” said Nehushtan. “A basic lesson we drew was the importance of preemption. We cannot wait until suicide bombers are on their way to the target or rockets are launched at our cities. We proved that the level of terrorist acts was dramatically reduced when we pursued them ranging from where they operate, to where commanders and planners are lurking at their hideouts in the cities. Such engagements require very precise and actionable intelligence, clear proof of the target’s intent, and surgical response with the measured effect necessary to neutralize the target without causing collateral damage.”
Performing in such activities was not what the IAF anticipated. Nehustan explained that the target characteristics of urban warfare, especially air warfare, are very challenging. “This is one of the most complex conflicts we’ve fought in,” said Nehushtan. Unlike general perceptions of “low-tech” threat, the IAF faces stealthy and evasive targets far more complex than conventional military targets. The enemy has the potential to cause considerable harm in many ways. Threats are not restricted to surface-to-air missiles and gunfire, but include risks caused by inadvertent collateral damage that could have strategic implications as well as negative reactions among local and international opinion.
Another challenge is posed by the terrain. “Distinct topographical features make urban warfare significantly more difficult than open terrain,” maintained Nehushtan. Clutter and irregularity of objects make navigation, orientation and coordination problematic. Complex operational restrictions and self-imposed rules of engagement are implemented to safeguard sensitive areas such as schools, hospitals, holy places, etc. In return, terrorists, who rarely abide to “war ethics,” tend to exploit such restrictions to establish “human shields” as they operate in or under civilian occupied buildings. “One can hardly define a clear ‘terrorist infrastructure target’ that can be attacked from the air,” said Nehustan. Such targets may reside in a specific room, which must be attacked from specific angles with highly accurate weapons, developing limited effect, devastating the target itself but without causing damage beyond it.
Such operations depend on actionable intelligence from real-time sensors, providing persistence and fast response to emerging opportunities. “Intelligence is not sufficient in itself. Target behavior is an issue that must also be considered,” stated Nehushtan. “Those under constant pursuit adapt with evasive behavior and expose themselves for very short time fractions. The window of opportunity to strike such targets may last only a few seconds, far below anything the military organization was prepared for in the past.”
Nehushtan considers several key capabilities necessary for effective air operations in urban areas. “Since modern terrorism resides and operates in urban surroundings, one must face it in such environments. Persistence is a key for effective engagement, keeping the enemy constantly on the defensive,” explained Nehushtan. Such activity requires full integration between intelligence, ground, air and special forces to ensure rapid engagement of time-critical targets (within seconds), without causing collateral damage to friendly forces and non combatants. To enable such rapid decisions, the IDF established “short decision cycles” employing highly skilled and experienced representatives from all relevant entities, who are familiar with the area and understand the implications of each mission. They can choose the physical means, location, intelligence opportunity and time for creating an effect without unnecessary damages.
Employing airpower has proved highly effective since mid-2003, after the IAF implemented efficient measures to control the signature and effect of its missions while assuming more responsibility within joint network operations. Adaptations were made to most platforms and weapons, preparing them for superior performance in the new mission profile. “We should be able to choose our means, weapons and effect from a pound to a ton,” said Nehushtan. At the beginning of this conflict the IAF did not have suitable ordnance to strike with required pinpoint precision in such restricted terrain modes. This shortfall, according to Nehushtan, has vanished. “We modified our systems, originally built for full-scale wars, introducing necessary changes and adaptations that now enable our improved performance and capabilities in both high-intensity and low-intensity warfare scenarios.” —Tamir Eshel
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